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Abstract. Mediation is a process, in which both parties
agree to resolve their dispute by negotiating over alternative
solutions presented by a mediator. In order to construct such
solutions, mediation brings more information and knowledge,
and, if possible, resources to the negotiation table. The con-
tribution of this paper is the automated mediation machin-
ery which does that. It presents an argumentation-based me-
diation approach that extends the logic-based approach to
argumentation-based negotiation involving BDI agents. The
paper describes the mediation algorithm. For comparison it il-
lustrates the method with a case study used in an earlier work.
It demonstrates how the computational mediator can deal
with realistic situations in which the negotiating agents would
otherwise fail due to lack of knowledge and/or resources.
1 Introduction and Motivation
Dispute resolution is a complex process, depending on the
will of involved parties to reach consensus, when they are
satisfied with the result of negotiation, which allows them
to partially or completely fulfil their goals with the avail-
able resources. In many cases, such negotiation depends on
searching for alternative solutions, which requires an exten-
sive knowledge about the disputed matter for sound argumen-
tation. Such information may not be available to the negoti-
ating parties and negotiation fails. Mediation, a less radical
alternative to arbitration, can assist both parties to come to
a mutual agreement. This paper presents an argumentation-
based mediation system that builds on previous works in the
field of argumentation-based negotiation. It is an extension of
the work presented in [1] and focuses on problems where ne-
gotiation stalled and had no solution. In [1] agents contain all
the knowledge and resources needed to resolve their dispute -
a relatively strong assumption in the context of real world ne-
gotiations. Agents present arguments, which their opponent
can either accept, reject, or they can negotiate on a possible
solution. As mentioned earlier, lacking knowledge or resources
may lead to an unsuccessful negotiation. In many cases, such
knowledge or even alternative resources may be available, but
agents are not aware of them.
Our extension proposes a role of a trust-worthy mediator
that possesses extensive knowledge about possible solutions
of mediation cases, which it can adapt to the current case.
Mediator also has access to various resources that may help
to resolve the dispute. Using this knowledge and resources,
as well as knowledge and resources obtained from agents, the
mediator creates alternative solutions, which become subject
to further negotiation.
In the next section, we summarise related work in the field
of automatic mediation and argumentation-based negotiation.
In Section 3, we recall the agent architecture proposed by Par-
sons et al. [1] and extend it with the notion of resources for
the purposes of the mediation system. Section 4 presents our
mediation algorithm. In Section 5, we revisit the home im-
provement agents example from [1] and apply our mediation
process. Section 6 concludes this work.
2 Previous Work
Computational mediation has recognized the role of the me-
diator as a problem solver. The MEDIATOR [2] focused on case-
based reasoning as a single-step for finding a solution to a dis-
pute resolution problem. The mediation process was reduced
to a one-step case-based inference, aimed at selecting an ab-
stract “mediation plan”. The work did not consider the value
of the actual dialog with the mediated parties. The PERSUADER
[3] deployed mechanisms for problem restructuring that op-
erated over the goals and the relationships between the goals
within the game theory paradigm, applied to labor manage-
ment disputes. To some extent this work is a precursor of
another game-theoretic approach to mediation, presented in
[4] and the interest-based negotiation approach in [5]. Notable
are recent game-theoretic computational mediators AutoMed
[6] and AniMed [7] for multi-issue bilateral negotiation under
time constraints. They operate within known solution space,
offering either specific complete solutions (AutoMed) or incre-
mental partial solutions (AniMed). Similar to the mediator
proposed in the ‘curious negotiator’ [8], both mediators mon-
itor negotiations and intervene when there is a conflict be-
tween negotiators. The Family Winner [9] manipulative me-
diator aimed at modifying the initial preferences of the par-
ties in order to converge to a feasible and mutually acceptable
solution. This line of works incorporated “fairness” in the me-
diation strategies [10].
In real settings information only about negotiation issues
is not sufficient to derive the outcome preferences [11]. An
exploratory study [12] of a multiple (three) issue negotiation
setting suggests the need for developing integrative (rather
than position-based) negotiation processes which take into
account information about the motivational orientation of ne-
gotiating parties. Incorporation of information beyond nego-
tiation issues has been the focus of a series of works related
to information-based agency [13, 14, 15]. Value-based argu-
mentation frameworks [16], interest-based negotiation [5] and
interest-based reasoning [11] considers the treatment of any
kind of motivational information that leads to a preference in
negotiation and decision making.
In this paper we propose a new mechanism for automatic
mediation using argumentation-based negotiation (ABN) as
a principal framework for mediation. ABN systems evolved
from classical argumentation systems, bringing power to
agents to resolve potential dispute deadlocks by persuasion
of agents in their beliefs and finding common acceptance
grounds by negotiation [17, 1, 18, 19]. ABN is performed by
exchanging arguments, which represent a stance of an agent
related to the negotiated subject and constructed from beliefs
of the agent. Such a stance can support another argument of
the agent, explain why a given offer is rejected, or provide
conditions upon which the offer would be accepted. Disputing
parties can modify their offer or present a counter-offer, based
on the information extracted from the argument. Arguments
can be used to attack [20] other arguments, supporting or jus-
tifying the original offer. With certain level of trust between
negotiating agents, arguments serve as knowledge exchange
carriers [1] - here we use such mechanisms to exchange in-
formation between negotiating parties and the mediator. The
decision of whether to trust the negotiating party or not is a
part of the strategy of an agent. Different strategies are pro-
posed in [21, 22, 23]. Apart from the strategy, essential are the
reasoning mechanisms and negotiation protocols. Relevant to
this work are logic frameworks that use argumentation as the
key mechanism for reasoning [24, 25, 26, 27]. Negotiation pro-
tocols, which specify the negotiation procedures include either
finite-state machines [1], or functions based on the previously
executed actions [28]. The reader is referred to [29] for the
recent state-of-the-art in ABN frameworks.
Our ABN framework for mediation allows us to seamlessly
design and execute realistic mediation process, which utilises
the power of argumentation, using agent logics and a negotia-
tion procedure to search for the common agreement space. We
have decided to extend the ABN framework in [1], due to the
clarity of its logics. In the next section we recall the necessary
aspects of the work in [1]. We describe the agent architec-
ture in the ABN systems and define the components that we
reuse in our work. Our agents reason using argumentation,
based on a domain dependent theory specified in a first-order
logic. Within the theory, we encode agent strategies, by defin-
ing their planning steps. Apart from agent theories, strategy
is defined also in bridge rules, explained further in the text.
We do not explore a custom protocol, therefore we adopt the
one from [1].
3 Agent Architecture
The ABN system presented in [1] is concerned with BDI
agents in a multi-context framework, which allows distinct
theoretical components to be defined, interrelated and easily
transformed to executable components. The authors use dif-
ferent contexts to represent different components of an agent
architecture, and specify the interactions between them by
means of the bridge rules between contexts. We recall briefly
the components of the agent architecture within the ABN sys-
tem in [1] and add a new “resources” component for mediation
purposes.
Units are structural entities representing the main compo-
nents of the architecture. There are four units within a multi-
context BDI agent, namely: the Communication unit, and
units for each of the Beliefs, Desires and Intentions. Bridge
rules connect units, which specify internal agent architecture
by determining their relationship. Three well-established sets
of relationships for BDI agents have been identified in [30]:
strong realism, realism and weak realism. In this work, we
consider strongly realist agents.
Logics is represented by declarative languages, each with a
set of axioms and a number of rules of inference. Each unit
has a single logic associated with it. For each of the mentioned
B, D, I, C units, we use classical first-order logic, with special
predicates B, D and I related to their units. These predicates
allow to omit the temporal logic CTL modalities as proposed
in [30].
Theories are sets of formulae written in the logic associated
with a unit. For each of the four units, we provide domain
dependent information, specified as logical expressions in the
language of each unit.
Bridge rules are rules of inference which relate formulae in
different units. Following are bridge rules for strongly realist
BDI agents:
I : I(α) ⇒ D : D(⌈α⌉) B : ¬B(α) ⇒ D : ¬D(⌈α⌉)
D : ¬D(α) ⇒ I : ¬I(⌈α⌉) C : done(e) ⇒ B : B(⌈done(e)⌉)
D : D(α) ⇒ B : B(⌈α⌉) I : I(⌈does(e)⌉) ⇒ C : does(e)
Resources are our extension of the contextual architecture
of strongly realist BDI agents. Each agent can possess a set of
resources Rv with a specific importance value for its owner.
This value may determine the order in which agents are will-
ing to give up their resources during the mediation process.
We define a value function v : S→ R, which for each resource
φ specifies a value ϑ ∈< 0, 1 >, v(φ) = ϑ. Set Rv is ordered
according to function v.
Units, logics and bridge rules are static components of the
mediation system. All participants have to agree on them be-
fore the mediation process starts. Theories and resources are
dynamic components, they change during the mediation pro-
cess depending on the current state of negotiation.
4 Mediation Algorithm
In a mediation process both parties try to resolve their dis-
pute by negotiating over alternative solutions presented by
a mediator. Such solutions are constructed, using available
knowledge and resources. Agent knowledge is considered pri-
vate and is not shared with the other negotiating party. Re-
sources to obtain alternative solutions may have a high value
for their owners or be entirely missing. Thus, we propose that
the role of the mediator is to obtain enough knowledge and
resources to be able to construct a new solution. The media-
tor presents a possible solution to agents (in the form of an
argument), which they either approve, or reject (attack). Par-
ties can negotiate over a possible solution to come to a mutual
agreement. Below we formally define the foundations of our
algorithm.
Definition 4.1. ∆ is a set of formulae in language L. An
argument is a pair (Φ, ω), Φ ⊆ ∆ and ω ∈ ∆ such that: (1)
Φ 0⊥; (2) Φ ⊢ ω; and (3) Φ is a minimal subset of ∆ satisfying
2.
Amediation game is executed in one or more rounds, during
which both mediator and agents perform various actions in or-
der to resolve the dispute. Algorithm 1 contemplates our pro-
posal of the mediation game. In the beginning of each round,
agents α and β have an opportunity to present new knowledge
to the mediator µ. This new knowledge is helping their case,
or helping to resolve the dispute. Agents can either present
knowledge in the form of formulas from their theory or new re-
sources. Resources can be presented in ascending order of im-
portance, one resource in each round or altogether, depending
on the strategy of agents. The mediator obtains knowledge by
executing function Γµi ← GetKnowledge(i), where i ∈ {α, β}.
The mediator incorporates knowledge Γµi into theory Γµ, ob-
taining Γ′µ. Please note, that the belief revision operator ⊕ is
responsible for eliminating conflicting beliefs from the theory.
Using the knowledge in Γ′µ, the mediator tries to construct a
new solution by executing the CreateSolution(Γ′µ) function.
If the solution does not exist and agents did not present new
knowledge in this round, mediation fails. Therefore, it is of
utmost importance that agents try to introduce knowledge in
each round. In the next step, the possible outcomes are:
• When both agents accept the solution, mediation finishes
with success.
• When both agents reject the solution, mediator adds the
incorrect solution ¬solution and the explanation of the re-
jection Γµ
′
i from both agents to its knowledge Γ
′
µ and starts
a new mediation round.
• When only one agent rejects the solution, a new negotiation
process is initiated, where agents try to come to a mutual
agreement (e.g. partial division of a specific item) resulting
to solution′. If this negotiation is successful, the mediator
records solution′ as a new solution and finishes mediation
with a success. If the negotiation fails, the mediator adds
the explanation of the failure Γµ
′′
i and the failed solution
to Γ′µ and starts a new mediation round.
The mediation process continues till a resolution is ob-
tained, or fails, when no new solution can be obtained, and
no new knowledge can be presented. In the next section, we
revisit the example of home improvement agents from [1] and
apply the mediation algorithm.
5 Case Study: Revisiting Home
Improvement Agents
In this example, agent α is trying to hang a picture on the
wall. Agent α knows that to hang a picture it needs a nail
and a hammer. Agent α only has a screw, and a hammer,
but it knows that agent β owns a nail. Agent β is trying to
hang a mirror on the wall. β knows that it needs a nail and a
hammer to hang the mirror, but β currently possesses only a
nail, and also knows that α has a hammer. Mediator µ owns
a screwdriver and knows that a mirror can be hung using a
screw and a screwdriver.
The difference with the example in [1] is that mediator owns
the knowledge and resource needed to resolve the dispute µ
and not the agents. This reflects the reality, when clients seek
advice of an expert to resolve their problem. As mentioned in
the Section 3, agents α and β are strongly realist BDI agents
using related bridge rules and predicate logic. We now define
Input : Agents α, β and the mediator µ. Γα, Γβ and
Γµ denote the knowledge of α, β and µ, while
Γµα and Γ
µ
β denote the knowledge presented to
the mediator µ respectively by α and β. ⊕ is a
belief revision operator
Output: Resolution of the dispute, or ⊥ if solution does
not exists.
1 repeat
2 Γµα ← GetKnowledge (α); // Theory and resources
from α
3 Γµβ ← GetKnowledge (β); // Theory and resources
from β
4 Γ′µ ← Γµ ⊕ (Γ
µ
α ∪ Γ
µ
β);
5 solution ← CreateSolution (Γ′µ);
6 if solution = ⊥ and Γµ = Γ
′
µ then
7 return ⊥ ; // Missing new knowledge and no
solution
8 end
9 if solution 6= ⊥ then
10 〈resultα,Γ
µ′
α 〉 ← Propose(µ, α, solution)
11 〈resultβ,Γ
µ′
β 〉 ← Propose(µ, β, solution)
12 Γ′µ ← Γ
′
µ ⊕ (Γ
µ′
α ∪ Γ
µ′
β )
13 if ¬resultα and ¬resultβ then
14 Γ′µ ← Γ
′
µ ⊕¬solution;
15 solution ← ⊥;
16 else if ¬resultα or ¬resultβ then
17 〈solution′, Γµ
′′
α , Γ
µ′′
β 〉 ← Negotiate (solution,
α, β);
18 Γ′µ ← Γ
′
µ ⊕ (Γ
µ′′
α ∪ Γ
µ′′
β )
19 if ¬solution′ then
20 Γ′µ ← Γ
′
µ ⊕ (¬solution ∪ ¬solution
′)
21 solution ← ⊥;
22 else
23 solution ← solution′
24 end
25 end
26 end
27 Γµ ← Γ
′
µ;
28 until solution 6= ∅;
29 return solution
Algorithm 1: Mediation algorithm
all the dynamic parts of the mediation system, i.e. domain
specific agent theory and bridge rules1.
5.1 Agent Theories
What follows, is the private theory Γα of the agent α, whose
intention is to hang a picture:
1 We adopt following notation: A.* is the theory introduced by the
agent α, B.* is the theory of the agent β, M.* is the mediator’s
theory, G.* is the general theory and R.* are bridge rules
I : Iα(Can(α, hang picture)) (A.1)
B : Bα(Have(α, picture)) (A.2)
B : Bα(Have(α, screw)) (A.3)
B : Bα(Have(α,hammer)) (A.4)
B : Bα(Have(β,nail)) (A.5)
B : Bα(Have(X,hammer)∧Have(X,nail) ∧
Have(X,picture)→ Can(X, hangP icture))
(A.6)
Please note, that agent α, contrarily to the example in [1],
no longer knows that a mirror can be hung with a screw and
a screwdriver. What follows, is the private theory Γβ of agent
β, whose intention is to hang a mirror.
I : Iβ(Can(β, hangMirror)) (B.1)
B : Bβ(Have(β,mirror)) (B.2)
B : Bβ(Have(β,nail)) (B.3)
B : Bβ(Have(X,hammer)∧Have(X,nail) ∧
Have(X,mirror)→ Can(X,hangMirror))
(B.4)
Following is the theory Γµ of the mediator µ, related to
the home improvement agents case (please note, that media-
tor’s knowledge can consist of many other beliefs, for example
learned from other mediation cases):
B : Bµ(Have(µ, screwdriver)) (M.1)
B : Bµ(Have(X,screw) ∧ Have(X,screwdriver)
∧
Have(X,mirror)→ Can(X,hang mirror)).
(M.2)
B : Bµ(Have(X,hammer)∧Have(X,nail) ∧
Have(X,mirror)→ Can(X,hangMirror))
(M.3)
We adopt the following theories from [1] with actions that
integrate different models reflecting real world processes such
as change of ownership, and processes that model decisions
and planning of actions. In what follows i ∈ {α, β}).
Ownership. When an agent (X) gives up artifact (Z) to
(Y), (Y) becomes its new owner:
B : Bi(Have(X,Z) ∧Give(X,Y, Z)→
Have(Y,Z))
(G.1)
Reduction. If there is a way to achieve an intention, an
agent adopts the intention to achieve its preconditions:
B : Bi(Ij(Q)) ∧Bi(P1 ∧ . . . ∧ Pk ∧ . . . ∧ Pn → Q)
∧¬Bi(R1 ∧ . . . ∧Rm → Q)→ Bi(Ij(Pl))
(G.2)
Generosity Mediator µ is willing to give up resource Q
B : Bµ(Have(µ,Q))→ ¬Iµ(Have(µ,Q)). (G.3)
Unicity. When an agent (X) gives an artifact (Z) away,
(X) longer owns it:
B : Bi(Have(X,Z) ∧Give(X,Y, Z)→
¬Have(X,Z))
(G.4)
Benevolence.When agent i does not need (Z) and is asked
for it by X, i will give Z up:
B : Bi(Have(i, Z) ∧ ¬Ii(Have, i, Z) ∧
Ask(X, i.Give(i, X, Z))→ Ii(Give(i,X, Z)))
(G.5)
Parsimony. If an agent believes that it does not intend to
do something, it does not believe that it will intend to achieve
the preconditions (i.e. the means) to achieve it:
B : Bi(¬Ii(Q)) ∧Bi(P1 ∧ . . . ∧ Pj ∧ . . . ∧ Pn →
Q)→ ¬Bi(Ii(Pj))
(G.6)
Unique choice. If there are two ways of achieving an in-
tention, only one is intended. Note that we use ▽ to denote
exclusive or.
B : Bi(Ii(Q)) ∧Bi(P1 ∧ . . . ∧ Pj ∧ . . . ∧ Pn → Q)
∧Bi(R1 ∧ . . . ∧ Rn → Q)→
Bi(Ii(P1 ∧ . . . ∧ Pn))▽Bi(Ii(R1 ∧ . . . ∧Rn))
(G.7)
A theory that contains free variables (e.g. X) is considered
the general theory, while a theory with bound variables (e.g. α
or β) is considered the case theory. The mediator stores only
the general theory for its reuse with future cases. In addition,
an agent’s theory contains rules of inference, such as modus
ponens, modus tollens and particularization.
5.2 Bridge Rules
What follows, is a set of domain dependent bridge rules
that link inter-agent communication and the agent’s internal
states.
Advice.When the mediator µ believes that it knows about
possible intention IX ofX it tells it toX. Also, when mediator
µ knows something (φ) that can help to achieve intention ϕ
of agent X, mediator tells it to X.
Bµ(IX(ϕ))⇒ Tell(µ,X,Bµ(IX(ϕ))) (R.1)
Bµ(IX(ϕ)) ∧ Bµ(φ→ IX(ϕ))⇒ Tell(µ,X,Bµ(φ→
IX(ϕ)))
(R.2)
Trust in mediator When an agent (i) is told of a belief
of mediator (µ), it accepts that belief:
C : Tell(µ, i, Bµ(ϕ))⇒ B : Bi(ϕ). (R.3)
Request.When agent (i) needs (Z) from agent (X), it asks
for it:
I : Ii(Give(X, i, Z))⇒ C : Ask(i,X,Give(X, i, Z)). (R.4)
Accept Request.When agent (i) asks something (Z) from
agent (X), and it is not in intention of (X) to have (Z), it is
given to i:
C : Ask(i,X,Give(X, i, Z)) ∧ ¬IX(Have(X,Z))⇒
Ii(Give(X, i, Z)).
(R.5)
5.3 Resources
In Section 3, we have introduced the notion of importance of
resources, which defines the order in which agents are giving
up their resources during the mediation process. The picture
and the hammer depend on the successful accomplishment of
agent’s α goal and have an importance value of 1. Agent β
owns a mirror and a nail, both with importance 1. All other
resources have importance 0.
5.4 Argumentation System
Our automatic mediation system uses the ABN system, pro-
posed in [1], which is based on the one proposed in [24]. The
system constructs a series of logical steps (arguments) for and
against propositions of interest and as such may be seen as
an extension of classical logic. In classical logic, an argument
is a sequence of inferences leading to a true conclusion. It is
summarized by the schema Γ ⊢ (ϕ,G), where Γ is the set of
formulae available for building arguments, ⊢ is a suitable con-
sequence relation, ϕ is the proposition for which the argument
is made, and G indicates the set of formulae used to infer ϕ,
with G ⊆ Γ.
5.5 Mediation
In this section, we follow Algorithm 1 and explain how we can
resolve the home improvement agent dispute using automatic
mediation. In comparison to Parsons et al. [1], our agents do
not possess all the knowledge and resources to resolve their
dispute; thus the classical argumentation fails. The mediation
algorithm runs in rounds and finishes with:
1. Success, when both agents accept the solution proposed by
the mediator.
2. Failure, when the mediator can not create a new solution
and no new knowledge or resources are presented in two
consecutive rounds.
The algorithm starts with the mediator gathering informa-
tion about the dispute from both agents (function GetKnowl-
edge). In the first round, agents α and β state their goals,
which become part of the mediator’s beliefs Bµ:
B : Bµ(Iα(Can(α, hang picture))) (M.4)
B : Bµ(Iβ(Can(β, hangMirror))) (M.5)
With this new theory, the mediator tries to construct a new
solution, and it fails. Therefore, in the next round, agents have
to present more knowledge or resources. Failing to do so would
lead to failure of the mediation process. To speed things up,
we assume that agents presented all the necessary knowledge
and resources in this single step, although this process can
last several rounds depending on the strategy of an agent. For
example, if a “cautious” agent owns more than one resource,
it chooses to give up the resource with the lowest importance.
B : Bµ(Have(α, picture)) (M.6)
B : Bµ(Have(α, screw)) (M.7)
B : Bµ(Have(α,hammer)) (M.8)
B : Bµ(Have(β,nail)) (M.9)
B : Bµ(Have(β,mirror)) (M.10)
With this new information, the mediator is finally able to
construct the solution to the dispute consisting of three dif-
ferent arguments. With the following two arguments, medi-
ator proposes agent β to hang the mirror using the screw
and the screwdriver (M.2), and screw can be obtained from
the agent α and the screwdriver obtained from the medi-
ator itself (Please note, that this knowledge is part of the
support for the presented arguments). The first argument is:
(Iβ(Give(α, β, screw)), P
′
β), where P
′
β is
2:
2 mp stands for modus ponens and pt stands for particularization
{(M.2),(M.5),(G.2)} ⊢pt,mp
Bµ(Iβ(Have(β, screw)))
(M.11)
{(M.7),(G.1)} ⊢mp
Bµ(Give(α, Y, screw)→ Have(Y, screw))
(M.12)
{(M.11),(M.12),(G.2)} ⊢pt,mp
Bµ(Iβ(Give(α, β, screw)))
(M.13)
{(M.13)} ⊢R.1 Tell(µ, β, Iβ(Give(α, β, screw))) (M.14)
{(M.14)} ⊢R.3 Iβ(Give(α, β, screw)) (M.15)
The second argument is: (Iβ(Give(µ, β, screwdriver)), P
′′
β ),
where P ′′β is
{(M.2),(M.5),(G.2)} ⊢pt,mp
Bµ(Iβ(Have(β, screwdriver)))
(M.16)
{(M.1),(G.1)} ⊢mp
Bµ(Give(µ, Y, screwdriver)→
Have(Y, screwdriver))
(M.17)
{(M.16),(M.17),(G.2)} ⊢pt,mp
Bµ(Iβ(Give(µ, β, screwdriver)))
(M.18)
{(M.18)} ⊢R.1
Tell(µ, β, Iβ(Give(µ, β, screwdriver)))
(M.19)
{(M.19)} ⊢R.3
Iβ(Give(µ, β, screwdriver))
(M.20)
These two arguments represent advices to β on how it can
achieve its goal (B.1) that was communicated to mediator
µ as (M.5). Using bridge rule (R.4) β converts this into the
following actions:
{M.15} ⊢R.4 Ask(β, α,Give(α, β, screw)).
{M.20} ⊢R.4 Ask(β, µ, Give(µ, β, screwdriver)).
When both α and µ receive this request, they convert this
into accept request action using bridge rule (R.5). Mediator
accepts this request due to the generosity theory (G.3), which
defines that it is not an intention of mediator to own any-
thing. Agent β cannot find a counter-argument that would
reject this request (it does not need the nail) and accepts
it. With the screw, the screwdriver, the mirror and knowl-
edge on how to hang the mirror using these tools, β can fulfil
its goal, and it no longer needs the nail. Therefore, the fol-
lowing argument that solves the goal of α is also accepted:
(Iα(Give(β, α, nail)), Pα), where Pα is:
{(M.3),(M.4),(G.2)} ⊢mp Bµ(Iα(Have(α,nail))) (M.21)
{(M.9),(G.1)} ⊢mp
Bµ(Give(β, Y, nail)→ Have(Y,nail))
(M.22)
{(M.21),(M.22),(G.2)} ⊢pt,mp
Bµ(Iα(Give(β, α, nail)))
(M.23)
{(M.23)} ⊢R.1
Tell(µ, α,Bµ(Iα(Give(β, α, nail))))
(M.18)
{(M.18)} ⊢R.3 Iα(Give(β, α, nail)) (M.19)
we convert this into action, using the bridge rule R.1 into:
{M.19} ⊢R.1 Ask(α,β, Give(β, α, nail)).
When agent β receives this request, β can accept it by the
bridge rule (R.5). This is only possible because of the previous
two arguments, when an alternative plan to hang the mirror
was presented to β, otherwise β would not be willing to give up
the nail needed for his plan. Agent β can now decide between
two plans using (G.7); therefore it decides to give α the nail
and both agents were able to fulfil their goals (we assume that
β does not want to sabotage the mediation).
6 Conclusion
Mediation brings more information and knowledge to the ne-
gotiation table, hence, an automated mediator would need
the machinery that could do that. Addressing this issue in
an automated setting, we have presented an ABN approach
that extends the logic-based approach to ABN involving BDI
agents, presented in [1]. We have introduced a mediator in
the multiagent architecture, which has extensive knowledge
concerning mediation cases and access to resources. Using
both, knowledge and resources, the mediator proposes solu-
tions that become the subject of further negotiation when
the agents in conflict cannot solve the dispute by themselves.
We have described our mediation algorithm and illustrated
it with the same case study introduced in [1]. The presence
of a mediator in ABN allows to deal with realistic situations
when negotiation is stalled. In this work we assumed that the
agents and the mediator operate within the same ontology,
describing the negotiation domain. In real settings, the nego-
tiators may interpret the same term differently. In order to
avoid this, mediation will require the initial alignment of the
ontologies with which all parties operate.
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